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The Frailty of Action 
Forgiving and Promising: The Redemption of Action through  
the Potentialities of Action itself in Arendt1
Theresa Calvet de Magalhães
In 1972, at a conference on her work organized by the Toronto Society for the Study of 
Social and Political Thought, to which Hannah Arendt was invited not only as the guest of 
honor but also, as it was her own wish, to participate, she said that “the main flaw and 
mistake of The Human Condition” [1958] was to “still look at what is called in the 
traditions the vita activa from the viewpoint of the vita contemplativa, without ever saying 
anything real about the vita contemplativa”. The main flaw, then, of her inquiry into the 
vita activa was to have in a way accepted that thinking is contemplative – though the lines 
of Cato which she quoted at the very end of that book (“Never is he more active than when 
he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by himself”) already pointed to the 
fundamental experience of the thinking ego, “an experience of sheer activity”, she now 
insists, “unimpeded by any physical or bodily obstacles”2.
Arendt’s analysis of the vita activa in The Human Condition3 can be described, and was 
characterized by Jacques Taminiaux, in 1992, in La fille de Thrace et le penseur 
professionnel4, as a replica to the Heideggerian “reappropriation” of the Greeks during 
the phase of the genesis of his “fundamental ontology”, and, to be more precise, in the 
lectures he delivered at Marburg, in 1924-1925, on the Sophist  - Interpretation 
Platonischer Dialoge (Sophistes)5- to which she, entirely fascinated, attended (Arendt was 
then 18 years old and Heidegger 35). This replica was written basically in function of a  
non-Heideggerian criterion – the excellence of the bios politikos. Heidegger, as you all 
certainly know and remember, is not once quoted in The Human Condition, and 
according to Taminiaux if he is not cited or mentioned at all, it is because  Arendt does 
1 The present paper is part of a larger research project I am developing as a professor at the Federal University 
of Minas Gerais, in Belo Horizonte (Brasil), at the Department of Philosophy. I am particular grateful to the 
DAAD (the German Academic Exchange Service) and CAPES (Brasil) for a three month grant which provided 
me with this unique  opportunity for carrying out my research at the Hannah Arendt Archiv, at the Carl von 
Ossietzky University, in Oldenburg. In January 2002, the Forschungskolloquium: Politische Theorien der 
Moderne offered me the opportunity to present a first version of my work. I want to express my sincere 
thanks to Professor Antonia Grunenberg  and to Professor Zoltan Szankay for their most helpful comments 
and criticism on this first draft of my paper and for their warm welcome during my whole stay in Germany. 
Stefan Ahrens and Bettina Koch deserve a special measure of thanks for showing patience, encouragement, 
and concrete help while I was doing my work, and for the lively exchange of ideas.
2 H. Arendt, “On Hannah Arendt”, in: Melvyn A. Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 
New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1979, p. 305. 
3 H. Arendt, The Human Condition [HC], Chicago, University of Chicago Press. The Human Condition owes its 
origin to a series of lectures, delivered in April, 1956, at the University of Chicago, under the title “Vita 
Activa”. German edition: Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1960.
4 J. Taminiaux, La fille de Thrace et le penseur professionnel. Arendt et Heidegger, Paris, Payot, 1992 
5 Edited by Ingeborg Schüssler, these lectures were published  in 1992 (M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 19, 
Platon: Sophistes). 
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not examine the bios theoretikos itself in this book (cf. La fille de Thrace et le penseur 
professionnel, p. 26).
Hannah Arendt had already announced her last work (The Life of the Mind6) not only 
when she said that thought “is still possible, and no doubt actual, wherever men live 
under the conditions of political freedom”, that “no other human capacity is so 
vulnerable” (in fact, she reminds us, “it is far easier to act under conditions of tyranny 
than it is to think”), that although  thought, as a living experience, “has always been 
assumed (…) to be known only to the few”, perhaps it was not presumptuous to believe, as 
she did, “that these few have not become fewer in our time” [my emphasis], and, finally, 
that “if no other test but the experience of being active were to be applied to the various 
activities within the vita activa” – that is, to labor, to work or fabrication, and to action – 
“it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all”, but also when she had 
asked at the end of The Human Condition if thinking was not a sheer activity, and quoted 
the lines that were ascribed by Cicero, in De Republica (1,17), to Cato: Numquam se plus 
agere quam nihil cum ageret, numquam minus solum esse quam cum solus esset (HC, p. 
297).
The starting point, then, of The Life of the Mind is this activity mentioned by old Cato 
in those lines which were quoted by Arendt at the very end of The Human Condition, and 
her aim - explicitly stated when she drew our attention at the end of the first volume of 
The Life of the Mind7 not to her “method” or her “criteria”, but to what, at least in her 
opinion, is the basic assumption of her investigation, and told us that she had “clearly 
joined the ranks of those who for some time now have been attempting to dismantle 
metaphysics, and philosophy with all its categories, as we know them from their 
beginning in Greece until today” (Thinking, p. 212) – was to elucidate the authentic 
experiences of thinking, willing and judging, or in other words, the actual experiences of 
the thinking, willing, and judging ego, which is aware of being active.
The Life of the Mind can be read as a critical appropriation of Heidegger, but one 
should not confuse the destruction [Destruktion] of the philosophical tradition done by 
Heidegger, in the context of the project of his fundamental ontology, or his critical 
deconstruction [Abbau] of the history of ontology - and is it really necessary to add here 
that this destruction or critical deconstruction does not at all mean for Heidegger the 
negation of tradition or condemning tradition to nullity and void but, on the contrary, a 
positive appropriation of that tradition8? -, which was actually done from the point of 
view of the Seinsfrage, with the dismantling of the three basic mental activities (thinking, 
willing, and judging) done here, in The Life of the Mind, by Arendt. Taminiaux had 
already made a distinction, in 1985, between the obvious formal kinship of the 
“deconstruction” projects in Heidegger and Arendt and the basic traits that separate these 
two projects, and had refused to consider Arendt a mere “disciple” of Heidegger:
6 H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind (Mary McCarthy, ed.). Vol. I: Thinking; Vol. II: Willing, New York, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1978. In 1975, in the “Description of Proposal” to Introduction into Politics, Arendt writes 
that The Human Condition “actually is a kind of prolegomena to the book which I now intend to write. It will 
continue where the other book ends” (Box 23, Special Correspondance, Rockefeller Foundation). 
7 See also the Conclusion to the course she gave, in 1971, on the History of the Will, in New York, at the New 
School for Social Research (Box 44, Subject File, Courses, History of the Will). 
8 Cf. M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 24, p. 3.
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“In both cases, the relation to the Greeks plays a very important role. (...) In both  
cases, what is at stake is to question conceptual schemes that became passe-partout 
(...) . In both, finally, this questioning aims at bringing back these conceptual 
schemes to the forgotten phenomenal bases which, at the origin, founded them (...) 
In contrast, (...) [i]t is much more the extra-philosophical testimony of the experience 
of action (particularly, Homer) and of the experience of political activity (for 
example, Thucydides), that helped Arendt and allowed her to rejoin the phenomenal 
bases of vita activa. No archaism here: these bases would not be exactly that if they 
were not susceptible of an actual retake (...).”9. 
And so, it is precisely because Heidegger made thought his home or exclusive dwelling, 
while Arendt had to learn, at her own cost, the price of an entirely different dwelling – the 
world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us – that her project remains irreducible to 
Heidegger’s. In contrast to Heidegger’s “destruction” of the history of ontology, the 
dismantling of the tradition in Arendt does not claim for thought any exclusive privilege. 
Her own experience of the effects of totalitarian rulership taught Arendt that her home 
was a world shared by a plurality of men, and not the activity of thinking. She knew, of 
course, that the activity of thinking is also necessary to protect this common or public 
realm. But this does not mean for Arendt that thinking could or should command all the 
other activities, fabrication, action, willing and the activity of judging. Her own 
“deconstruction” of the tradition aims at dismantling the fallacies produced  by the 
privilege which was given to thinking10. And such dismantling is possible only, says 
Arendt, “on the assumption that the thread of tradition is broken and that we shall not be 
able to renew it” (Thinking, p. 212). The rupture of tradition liberates our sight: the 
dismantling process itself does not consist in destroying or breaking up, but in showing, 
manifesting, or revealing, that is, in a “phenomenological” deconstruction. Her own 
technique of dismantling consists in saving the phenomena from the involucre of 
inherited theses that amalgamate what one has to distinguish11. In other words, the 
dismantling process itself aims to differentiate or to distinguish what the “professional 
thinkers” (the Denker von Gewerbe as Kant, not without irony, called them in his 
Critique of Pure Reason) tend to amalgamate.
When I tried to elucidate the “phenomenological” deconstruction or the dismantling of 
the faculty of the Will and, more specifically, to expound the complexities of this 
dismantling process in the long section of Willing on Augustine (“Augustine, the first 
philosopher of the Will”, pp. 85-110), at a Colloquium on Hannah Arendt, organized by 
the Philosophy Department of the State University of Campinas, in São Paulo12, I had 
already said something about the Will’s redemption and also that the price of this 
redemption is freedom.
9 J. Taminiaux, “Arendt, disciple de Heidegger?”, Études Phénoménologiques, No 2 (1985), pp. 121-123. 
10 Cf. J. Taminiaux, La fille de Thrace et le penseur professionnel, p. 36.
11 See also here R. Peeters, “La Vie de l’Esprit n’est pas contemplative. Hannah Arendt et le démantèlement de 
la Vita Contemplativa”, in: A.-M. Roviello and M. Weyemberg, Hannah Arendt et la modernité, Paris, Vrin, 
1992, pp. 9-26, and F. Xarão, Política e Liberdade em Hannah Arendt, Ijuí, Unijuí Press, 2000, pp. 93-96. 
12 Th. Calvet de Magalhães, “Hannah Arendt e a desconstrução ‘fenomenológica’ da atividade de querer”, Anais 
do Colóquio Hannah Arendt (June 2000), Campinas, Unesp Press, 2002 (in print).  
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As far as willing is concerned, Arendt had already told us, in the Postscriptum to the first 
volume of The Life of the Mind, that the will can be considered as “an organ of free 
spontaneity that interrupts all causal chains of motivation that would bind it”, but that, as 
Bergson had said, in 1889, at the very end of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la 
conscience, “il nous arrive rarement de vouloir”, that is, that “free acts are exceptional”, or 
in other words, “that it is impossible to deal with the willing activity without touching on 
the problem of freedom”, that she not only takes the “internal evidence” (what Bergson 
called the “immediate datum of consciousness”) seriously but also agrees that “this datum 
and all problems connected with it were unknown to Greek antiquity”, and, therefore, that 
she must accept that the faculty of the will was “discovered”, that “we can date this 
discovery historically, and that we shall thereby find that it coincides with the discovery of 
human “inwardness” as a special region of our life”13, that it is a “paradoxical and self-
contradictory faculty”, that projects (and not objects) are the subject matter of the Will, 
and that this faculty is, therefore, turned to the future, and, finally, that “volition is the 
inner capacity by which men decide about “whom” they are going to be, in what shape 
they wish to show themselves in the world of appearances” (Thinking, pp. 213-214).
But she had also announced, in this Postscriptum, that modern thinkers have always 
covered with metaphysical fallacies these phenomenological features. In the 
“Introduction” to Willing, Arendt explicitly says that the phenomena she has to deal with, 
in this second volume of her work, “are overlaid to an extraordinary extent by a coat of 
argumentative reasoning, by no means arbitrary and hence not to be neglected but which 
parts company with the actual experiences of the willing ego in favor of doctrines and 
theories that are not necessarily interested in ‘saving the phenomena’” (Willing, p. 3). 
What I tried to elucidate at the above mentioned Colloquium on Hannah Arendt, in 
Campinas (São Paulo), was how, in Willing, she saves the phenomena from the 
conceptual fallacies that cover or overlay them. 
At the very beginning of Willing, Arendt observes that “[i]t is in the nature of every 
critical examination of the faculty of the Will that it should be undertaken by 
“professional thinkers” (Kant’s Denker von Gewerbe), and this gives rise to the suspicion 
that the denunciations of the Will as a mere illusion of consciousness and the refutations 
of its very existence, which we find supported by almost identical arguments in 
philosophers of widely different assumptions, might be due to a basic conflict between the 
experiences of the thinking ego and those of the willing ego” (p. 4). And “[a]lthough it is 
always the same mind that thinks and wills”, says Arendt, “it is  by no means a matter of 
course that the thinking ego’s evaluation can be trusted to remain unbiased and 
“objective” when it comes to other mental activities” (p. 4). In the last section (“The abyss 
of freedom and the novus ordo seclorum”) of her “Conclusions” of Willing, she once more 
insists that “every philosophy of the Will is conceived and articulated not by men of action 
but by philosophers, Kant’s “professional thinkers”, who in one way or another are 
committed to the bios theoretikos” (p. 195). We cannot, then, expect from “professional 
thinkers” a fair estimate of  the willing faculty.
13 That is, Hannah Arendt announces, in this Postscriptum, that she will analyze, in the second volume of The 
Life of the Mind, the faculty of the Will in terms of its history.
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The experiences of the thinking ego are not the starting point of Arendt’s dismantling of 
the faculty of the Will: according to her, the “internal evidence of an I-will” has to be 
taken as “sufficient testimony to the reality of the phenomenon”, and since she agrees 
with Gilbert Ryle (and many others) that this faculty was unknown to Greek antiquity, she 
must then accept what Ryle, in The Concept of Mind [1949], rejects, namely, that the 
faculty of the Will “was indeed “discovered” and can be dated” (Willing, p. 5). In other 
words, and she had already said this in the Postscriptum to Thinking, Arendt analyses 
here the Will in terms of its history.
Thinking and willing make present to our mind what is actually absent, but differently 
from thinking, which draws into its enduring present not only what is but also what at 
least has been, willing, turned to the future14, deals with things that have never existed at 
all, and “moves in a region where no such certainties exist” (Willing, p. 35). There is, 
therefore, a clash between these two mental activities: the Will’s tonality is the very 
opposite of serenity (the predominant mood of the thinking ego), and since the activity of 
willing is not, like our thinking faculty, closely connected with remembrance15, it does not 
incline to melancholy (“the mood characteristic of the philosopher”).The predominant 
mood of the Will is tenseness, a kind of disquiet, easily bordering on turmoil, a tension 
that can be overcome only by doing (Willing, p. 38). What Arendt in fact questions is the 
solution that was given by “professional thinkers” to the fundamental conflict between 
thinking and  willing -  to deny the Will, and to reduce it to a mere illusion of 
consciousness, or to atrophy the Will, and to limit it to a mere free choice between things 
equally possible and given to us.
The Will as such, insists Arendt, in the last section of Chapter II of Willing, cannot 
escape the intrinsic conflict which crosses its freedom: “the Will’s redemption (...) comes 
from the act which (...) interrupts the conflict between velle and nolle” - between the 
capacity of willing and nilling – or in other words, “the Will is redeemed by ceasing to will 
and starting to act, and the cessation cannot originate in an act of the will-not-to-will 
because this would be but another volition” (Willing, pp. 101-102). The Will’s redemption 
cannot be mental, and it is in this context of the notion of a redemption of the Will 
through action that the theme of the beginning is mentioned. Augustine introduces a 
supplementary element, when he confronts the temporality of the human faculties with 
the eternity of God, in the last of his great treatises, De Civitate Dei [413-426], and Arendt 
resumes here the scope of this confrontation for the phenomenology of the Will: God, 
“himself eternal”, and therefore “without beginning”, not only created time and the world 
(“the world was made not in time, but simultaneously with time”), but He created man as 
essentially temporal, and not only as a creature who just lives “in time”. The creation of 
the world does not coincide with the creation of man, and to mark this difference 
Augustine uses the word initium for the creation of man, and the word principium for the 
creation of the heaven and earth (De Civitate Dei, bk. XI, chap. xxxii). God created man as 
14 The moment we turn our mind to the future, says Arendt, we are concerned with projects, and “just as the 
past always presents itself to the mind in the guise of certainty, the future’s main characteristic is its basic 
uncertainty... .  In other words, we are dealing with matters that never were, that are not yet, and that may 
well never be” (Willing, p. 14).
15 Remembrance, as Arendt had already said  in the first volume of The Life of the Mind, has a natural affinity to 
thought: all thoughts are strictly speaking  after-thoughts (Thinking, p. 78, and p.  87).
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a new beginning in order that there may be novelty. This power to take initiative in the 
singular cannot be dissociated from Man’s character of individuality which manifests 
itself in the Will: with man, writes Arendt, “a being came into the world that (...) could be 
endowed with the capacity of willing and nilling” (Willing, pp. 108-109). And she can, 
then, conclude: “if Augustine had drawn the consequences of these speculations, he would 
have defined men, not, like the Greeks, as mortals, but as “natals”, and he would have 
defined the freedom of the Will not as the liberum arbitrium (...) but as the freedom of 
which Kant speaks in the Critique of Pure Reason" (Willing, p. 109), that is, the faculty of 
spontaneously beginning a series of successive things or states (Critique of Pure Reason, 
B 474).
It is not Augustine’s notion of freedom as liberum arbitrium, but an entirely differently 
conceived notion of freedom (freedom equated now with the human capacity of beginning 
something new and unpredictable) which appears in his political treatise, De Civitate Dei, 
that Arendt wants to retake: “Because he is a beginning, man can begin; to be human and 
to be free are one and the same”16. In the last section of the “Conclusions” of Willing, 
Arendt turns from the willing faculty  to political liberty and the realm of action. She had 
hoped to find in men of action a notion of freedom purged of the difficulties or 
perplexities caused by the reflexive character of the Will insofar as it is a mental faculty, 
but to her disappointment only arrived at the conclusion that wherever men of action, 
men who wanted to change the world, began to prepare in earnest for an entirely new 
beginning, they looked for a precedent. The two great foundation legends of Western 
civilization, the Hebrew and the Roman, that have acted as guides for Western political 
thought, point to the problem - the abyss of freedom - without solving it: “The abyss of 
pure spontaneity (...) was covered by the device, typical of the Occidental tradition (the 
only tradition where freedom has always been the raison d’être of all politics) of 
understanding the new as an improved re-statement of the old” (Willing, p. 216). Hannah 
Arendt concludes the second volume of The Life of the Mind by returning to the only one 
tentative alternative she knows, in our entire history of political thought, to such a 
frustrating conclusion, that is, she retakes Augustine’s notion of freedom as a character of 
human existence in the world. In De Civitate Dei, when Augustine rooted the very 
capacity for beginning in natality, he mentioned, says Arendt, but did not explicate, “what 
could have become the ontological underpinning for a truly Roman (...) philosophy of 
politics” (Willing, pp. 216-217). 
My work on the theme of the redemption of the modalities of the vita activa in Arendt, 
and, to be more specific, on the redemption of action in the last two sections 
(“Irreversibility and the Power To Forgive”, and “Unpredictability and the Power of 
Promise”) of Chapter V (Action) of The Human Condition, aims at retaking Arendt’s 
analysis of the chief character of action - its frailty - and to expound its relation to moral 
activity in the two last sections on forgiving and binding oneself through promises of her 
chapter on action.
The description of the activity that The Human Condition introduces as “the only 
activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter”, 
16 .H. Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight exercises in political thought, New York, Viking Press, 1968, p. 
167. 
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and as an activity which “corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that 
men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (HC, p. 9), heightens two 
outstanding characters of action - its inherent boundlessness, and its inherent 
unpredictability,  but also its futility, its frailty, and the irreversibility of the process 
started by acting (HC, pp.171, 174, 208-209). In Arendt’s analysis, action itself, the 
spontaneous beginning of something new, appears altogether ambiguous and 
paradoxical: 
“the human capacity for freedom (...), by producing the web of human relationships, 
seems to entangle its producer to such an extent that he appears much more the 
victim and the sufferer than the author and doer of what he has done. Nowhere, in 
other words, neither in labor, subject to the necessity of life, nor in fabrication, 
dependent upon given material, does man appear to be less free than in those 
capacities whose very essence is freedom and in that realm which owes its existence 
to nobody and nothing but man” (HC, pp. 209-210).
To act is both to exercise freedom and to lose it. Not only men of action, but also men of 
thought have always searched a substitute for this paradoxical character of action. For 
Arendt, the attempts to escape from the frailty of strictly human affairs amount to the 
abolition of the public realm itself. In her view, the hallmark of all these various attempts 
to retreat from politics altogether, or to destroy the web of human relationships 
altogether, is  the concept of rule, that is, “the notion that men can lawfully and politically 
live together only when some are entitled to command and the others forced to obey” 
(HC, p. 198). We find, already in Plato, such an escape, says Arendt, and also an 
interpretation of action in terms of fabrication. The vocabulary of political theory and 
political thought testifies the persistence and success of this transformation of action into 
fabrication. But this is not the object of my present work.
Arendt did not look upon freedom with the eyes of the tradition, and she did not 
identify freedom with sovereignty17. In her view, the capacity for action or the initiative of 
action is always accompanied with calamities, or with what she calls the “disabilities of 
non-sovereignty”. It is then, in this context of her analysis of action, that the question 
“whether the capacity for action does not harbor within itself certain potentialities which 
enable it to survive the disabilities of non-sovereignty” arises, and that the theme of the 
redemption of action is introduced (HC, p. 211).
In contrast to labor and work, action owes its redemption not to a different and 
“possibly higher” faculty, but to potentialities of action itself. The first  - forgiving - relates 
to the past and serves to undo its deeds: “The possible redemption from the predicament 
of irreversibility – of being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and 
could not, have know what he was doing18 – is the faculty of forgiving”. The second - 
17 “If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the same, then indeed no man could be free, because 
sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very 
condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth” (HC, p. 
210; my emphasis). 
18 .Not only “he who acts never quite knows what he is doing,”, and “always becomes “guilty” of consequences 
he never intended or even foresaw”, but “no matter how disastrous and unexpected the consequences of his 
deed he can never undo it” (HC, p. 209).
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binding oneself through promises - relates to the future and serves to set up in that ocean 
of uncertainty  islands of security: “The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic 
uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises” (HC, pp. 
212-213).
For Arendt, these two forms of redemption are inherent in action itself, and depend on 
plurality:
“Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our 
capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could 
never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever (...). Without 
being bound to the fulfillment of promises, we would never be able to keep our 
identities; we would be condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in the 
darkness, of each man’s lonely heart (...) – a darkness which only the light shed over 
the public realm through the presence of others, who confirm the identity between 
the one who promises and the one who fulfils, can dispel. Both faculties, therefore, 
depend on plurality, on the presence and acting of others (...); forgiving and 
promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain without reality and can signify no 
more than a role played before one’s self” (HC, p. 213; my emphasis).
Since these two faculties correspond so closely to the fact that to live always means to live 
among men, in other words, among those who are my equals19, their role in politics 
establishes a set of guiding principles, which is “diametrically different (…) from the 
“moral” standards inherent in the Platonic notion of rule” (HC, p. 213). For Arendt, this 
diametrically different “moral code”, inferred from the faculties of forgiving and of 
making promises, rests on experiences which  are entirely based  on the presence of 
others, that is, on experiences which nobody could ever have in solitude or in isolation.
These two intrinsic modes of redemption were unknown to the Greeks. It was Jesus of 
Nazareth who discovered “the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs”. The fact 
that this discovery was made in a religious context, argues Arendt, “is no reason to take it 
any less seriously in a strictly secular sense”. According to Arendt this discovery sprang 
from an authentic political experience whose first germ may be seen in the Roman 
principle parcere subjectis: “The only rudimentary sign of an awareness that forgiveness 
may be the necessary corrective for the inevitable damages resulting from action may be 
seen in the Roman principle to spare the vanquished (parcere subjectis) – a wisdom 
entirely unknown to the Greeks – or in the right to commute the death sentence, probably 
also of Roman origin (…)” (HC, p. 215).
Forgiveness releases the agent from the consequences of an act, and it is only through 
this liberation that the agent remains a free agent: “Only through this constant mutual 
release from what they do can men remain free agents” (HC, p. 216). In this respect, 
forgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, which bounds the agent to the chain of 
consequences of the first misdeed. Forgiveness, in contradistinction to revenge, retains 
the unpredictability so characteristic of action: “Forgiving (…) is the only reaction which 
19 According to Arendt,  human plurality “is specifically the condition – not only the conditio sine qua non, but 
the conditio per quam – of all political life” (HC, p. 10) .  
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does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which 
provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and 
the one who is forgiven” (HC, p. 216). Forgiving is thus closely connected with action, and 
since we only forgive what was done for the sake of who did it, the undoing of what was 
done, insists Arendt, “seems to show the same revelatory character as the deed itself” 
(HC, p. 217)20. On the other hand, there is a parallel between punishment and forgiveness: 
“both have in common that they attempt to put an end to something that without 
interference could go on endlessly” (HC, p.p. 216-217)21.
The faculty to make and keep promises, as one of the remedies inherent in action, was 
also unknown to the Greeks. We may trace it back,  according to Arendt, “to the Roman 
legal system, the inviolability of agreements and treaties (pacta sunt servanda)”, but we 
could also consider Abraham, “the man from Ur”, the discoverer of the power of covenant 
or mutual promise. At any rate, argues Arendt, “the great variety of contract theories since 
the Romans attests to the fact that the power of making promises has occupied the center 
of political thought over the centuries” (HC, p. 219). The act of making promises redeems 
action from the  predicament of unpredictability that this activity owes not only to “the 
basic unreliability of men who never can guarantee today who they will be tomorrow”, 
which is the price they pay for freedom, but also to “the impossibility of foretelling the 
consequences of an act within a community of equals where everybody has the same 
capacity to act”, which is the price men pay for plurality and reality (HC, p. 219).  Or, in 
other words, the faculty of promising “corresponds exactly to the existence of a freedom 
which was given under the condition of non-sovereignty” (HC, p. 220).  In Arendt’s view, 
the force of mutual promise or contrat is the force that keeps together or binds all those 
that interact, by setting up “isolated island of certainty”, that is, “certain islands of 
predictability” and “certain guideposts of reliability” in what remains an  “ocean of 
uncertainty” (HC, p. 220). According to Arendt, sovereignty “assumes, in the case of many 
men mutually bound by promises, a certain limited reality. The sovereignty resides in the 
resulting, limited independence from the incalculability of the future, and its limits are 
the same as those inherent in the faculty itself of making and keeping promises” (HC, p. 
220). Nietzsche, “in his extraordinary sensibility to moral phenomena”, recalls here 
Arendt, not only “saw in the faculty of promises (the “memory of the will”, as he called it) 
the very distinction which marks off human from animal life”, but “saw with unequaled 
clarity the connection between human sovereignty and the faculty of making promises”, 
in the second treatise of his work Zur Genealogie der Moral (HC, p. 221). 
Arendt seeks then, with forgiving and making promises, “moral” norms that do not rest 
on a possibly higher faculty than action or on experiences exterior to its realm. To be valid 
politically, morality can only support itself on remedies inherent in action, that is, on 
remedies  that “arise directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of 
acting and speaking”; as moral precepts, therefore, “readiness to forgive and to be 
20.“But the fact that the same who, revealed in action and speech, remains also the subject of forgiving is the 
deepest reason why nobody can forgive himself; here, as in action and speech  generally, we are dependent 
upon others, to whom we appear in a distinctness which we ourselves are unable to perceive” (HC, p, 218).
21 “It is therefore quite significant, a structural element in the realm of human affairs, that men are unable to 
forgive what they cannot punish and that they are unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgivable” 
(HC, p. 217). 
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forgiven, to make promises and to keep them (…) are like control mechanisms built into 
the very faculty to start new and unending processes” (HC, p. 221). The fact of natality, in 
which the very capacity for beginning or the capacity for action is rooted, is then what 
“saves” the realm of human affairs. 
The foregoing remarks have been intended as a mere outline of the research project I 
am writing. They indicate that a finer analysis of the text of The Human Condition reveals 
authentic political experiences that bestow upon human affairs faith and hope, “two 
essential characteristics of human existence which Greek antiquity ignored altogether “ 
(HC, p. 222), and a variety of political experiences that our tradition of political thought 
has eliminated or excluded from articulate conceptualization.
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